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Abstract
In repeated games with di®erential information on one side, the labelling
\general case" refers to games in which the action of the informed player is
not known to the uninformed, who can only observe a signal which is the
random outcome of his and his opponent's action. Here we consider the
problem of minimizing regret (in the sense ¯rst formulated by Hannan [8])
when the information available is of this type. We give a simple condition
describing the approachable set.
JEL Classi¯cation: D81, D82, D83.
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11 Introduction
In a very early paper Hannan [8] showed the following well known result. In
a repeated game a player can use a strategy that, against any strategy of the
opponent gives a regret which becomes arbitrarily close to zero as the length of
the game increases. Regret is de¯ned as the di®erence between the average payo®
along a play and the maximum payo® that the player could get in the one shot
game if he could choose his action, when in turn the opponent is choosing his action
according to the frequency on the sequence of the play. In other words the player
in the repeated game in the limit is just as well o® as someone who is informed
in advance of the frequency of choices of the opponent. In Hannan's theorem the
player is informed in each period of the action chosen by the opponent, that is he
has full monitoring.
This result has been extended and improved in several later papers. In par-
ticular Blackwell gave a very simple proof of this result, as a corollary of his ap-
proachability result: see [3]. Other contributions are: [2], [12], [4]. In particular
the basic intuition of regret has been extended to game theory (see Fudenberg and
Levine, [7]). For a detailed an informative discussion of this results, and the related
literature on calibrated forecasting, see Foster and Vohra [6].
In a recent paper Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and Schapire (see [1]) have ex-
tended Hannan's result to the case in which the player is informed only of his own
payo®: so the choice of action of the opponent can only be inferred from the real-
ized payo®. This result can be considered a surprising extension of the multi-armed
bandit, to a problem where no assumption is made on the stochastic property of
the arms.
In this paper we extend the mimimum regret result to the general case in
which the action of the player and of the opponent generates a random signal
which is communicated to the player, i.e. the case of partial monitoring. Some
basic concepts and de¯nitions are needed to state the result precisely.
2 Description of the game
We consider a game which is played over in¯nitely many periods.
There are two players, denoted by I and II for the ¯rst and second player
respectively. Each player has a ¯nite action set, S = f1;:::;s;:::;Sg for player
I and T = f1;:::;t;:::;Tg for player II. To simplify the notation we write, in
subscripts, st rather than (s;t).
The payo® matrix for player II is denoted by G0 2 RST; an element of the
matrix is denoted by G0(s;t). We are going to build upon the literature on zero-
sum games with di®erential information on one side, with player II uninformed:
in this literature, the second player is usually minimizing his payo®. To make
the connection with that literature easier, we also assume that the player II is
minimizing his payo®. The payo® of player I is irrelevant for our purposes, so we
2do not introduce notation for it; to ¯x ideas think of the game as a zero-sum game.
The action chosen by player I is not reavealed to player II directly, but only
through the mediation of a signaling structure, which we now describe. For any
¯nite set X, the set of probability measures on X is denoted by ¢(X). Q is
a function from S £ T to ¢(B), where B is a ¯nite set of signals; a signaling
structure is the pair (B;Q). For every pair of actions (s;t) of the two players, a
signal is chosen according to the probability Q(s;t) and then reported to player
II. The probability measure concentrated on b is denoted by ±fbg.
A ¯rst example of signaling structure is: B¤ ´ S £T, Q¤(s;t) ´ ±fstg. Here the
action of the two players is announced to both; this signaling structure (B¤;Q¤) is
called full monitoring.
A second example: the set of signals is the set of possible values of the payo®
to player II, that is
B ´ [(s;t)2S£TG
0(s;t); (2.1)
and for every (s;t),
Q(s;t) ´ ±fG0(s;t)g; (2.2)
so the signaling structure informs player II exactly of his payo® in that period.
Player I has better information: he knows the actions of both players as well
as the signal announced to the second player. In a zero-sum game, this is clearly
the worst possible case for player II.
The game is played over in¯nitely many periods. At each period n player I
chooses action sn and player II chooses action tn. Then player I is informed of
the action of the other player. At the same time a signal is chosen according to
the distribution Q(sn;tn) and is announced to the both players.
A history at period n for player I is the history of the actions of the two players,
and of the signals, up to time n, that is an element in (S £T £B)n. A history at
period n for player II is a history of his actions and the signals observed, namely
an element in (T £B)n.
A strategy for player I is a sequence ¾ ´ (¾0;¾1;:::;¾n;:::) of functions, where
¾n : (S £T £ B)n ! ¢(S) for every n ¸ 1. A strategy for player II is a sequence
¿ ´ (¿0;¿1;:::;¿n;:::) of functions, where ¿n : (T £ B)n ! ¢(T) for every n ¸ 1.
¾0 and ¿0 are constant strategies.
For each n, a pair of strategies (¾;¿), together with the signaling structure
(B;Q) induces a probability distribution P(¾;¿) on the product space (S £T £B)n.
















]fn : sn = sg; (2.4)
3where ] denotes the cardinality of the set. Our main result will relate the di®erence
between the average payo® until stage N and the minimum payo® that player II
could get in the stage game. The stage game is the zero-sum game with player I
and II as players, action sets S and T respectively, payo® matrix G0, and player
II is minimizing. We use the symbols x;x0 and y for the mixed strategies in this
game of player I and II. To avoid heavy notation, we agree that a vector on the
left of a matrix is a row vector, and a vector on the right is a column vector; so
xG0y denotes the sum
P
s;t xsG0(s;t)yt; also since Q 2 ¢(B)S£T, xQ 2 ¢(B)T.
Note ¯nally that any signaling structure such that:
if xQ = x
0
Q then x = x
0
(2.5)
reveals to player II the vector x, if he knows the vector xQ. Signaling structures
with the property (2.5) may be strictly weaker than the full monitoring. For
instance, if S = T = 3, B = f0;1g, and the matrix (Q(s;t)(0))(s;t)2S£T is the
identity matrix, then (2.5) is satis¯ed, but for any ¯xed t 2 T the element xQ(¢;t) 2
¢(B) is not enough to determine x. Our main result (see theorem 3.2) implies that
from the point of view of minimizing regret, the signaling structure that satisfy
the even weaker condition:









(hence in particular those that satisfy 2.5) are as good for player II as the full
monitoring one.
Examples of signaling structures that satisfy (2.6) are those that give full mon-
itoring, or those that satisfy (2.5)); a second example is provided by those that
inform player II of his own payo® (de¯ned in (2.1) and (2.2)). The latter ones
are considered by Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and Schapire [1]. We say that the
signaling structures that satisfy (2.6) give statistically perfect monitoring. We now
have all the preliminary notions necessary to present the main result.
3 Minimizing Regret: the Main Result
In loose terms in the full monitoring case regret at N for a given history is de¯ned as
the di®erence between the average payo® at N and the best (that is, the minimum)
payo® for player II had he known the frequency of actions of player I. In the case
of partial monitoring this idea has to be re¯ned, since the frequency of actions is
not directly observed.
Our main result states that in the general case of imperfect monitoring the
regret is, in the worst case, the di®erence between the average payo® until stage
N and the minimum payo® that player II could get against any mixed strategy
of player I given the same frequency of signals, in the stage game. To make this













As in the literature on minimizing regret, we are going to prove that there is
strategy for player II which is e®ective against any strategy of player I. To clarify
the meaning of the word e®ective in the present context we begin with the case in
which the frequency of the actions of player I converges to a limit value, x¤ say.
In the case of full monitoring the strategy gives to player II, in the limit, a
payo® which is at most equal to the minimum he can achieve in the stage game,
where the ¯rst player is playing the mixed strategy x¤. This is Hannan's theorem.
In the general case player II cannot observe the frequency x¤ but only, at best,
the induced frequency of signals x¤Q. We say \at best" because he will be able to
do so only if he plays with su±cient frequency di®erent actions, since the signal he
observes depends on his action and the other player's action. Our main theorem
implies that player II can achieve in the limit the worst case payo® among the
strategies that give the same frequency of signals. This is precisely the value
©Q(x¤). More generally when the frequency of actions of player I does not converge,
the theorem says that the di®erence between the average payo® at n and the value
©Q(fn) tends to zero as n tends to in¯nity.
We now state Hannan's theorem and our main result in an informal way: for a
precise statement, see the proposition (5.6) below.
Theorem 3.1 (Hannan) For the full monitoring structure there is a strategy for
player II such that for any strategy of player I the di®erence between the average
payo® at n, g0
n and ©Q¤(fn) tends to zero as n tends to in¯nity.
Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and Schapire [1] generalize this to signaling struc-
tures that inform player II of his own payo®. We generalize this result to general
signaling structure, as follows:
Theorem 3.2 (Main Result) For all signaling structures there is a strategy for
player II such that for any strategy of player I the di®erence between the average
payo® at n, g0
n, and ©Q(fn) tends to zero as n tends to in¯nity.
We illustrate the result with some examples.
3.1 Examples
In these examples S = T. Let Id be the S£S identity matrix. For a ¯rst example,
take S = T = f1;2g, and consider the simple prediction game: the player II has to
guess the next move of player I; so G0 ´ ¡Id. The signal set is B ´ f0;1g; so the
5matrix Q is completely described by the numbers Q(s;t)(0) giving the probability
of the signal 0.





then the signaling structure is equivalent to full monitoring (for each action he
plays, player II knows which action player I has played). In this case Hannan's
theorem implies that if the frequency of the two actions converges to (x1;x2), then
player 1 can get a payo® of minf¡x1;¡x2g, which is our function ©Q¤ in this case.
In other words, if we let the set C µ R £¢(S) be de¯ned as
C ´ f(y;x
1;x
2) : y ￿ minf¡x
1;¡x
2gg (3.8)
then the set C is approachable by player II.





This example is similar to the one discussed in Helmold, Littlestone and Long,
[10]. In this case when the player II plays the second action he receives no useful
information on the move of player I in that period, while by playing the ¯rst action
he knows exactly what action the ¯rst player has chosen.
Our main result implies that the same set C as de¯ned in (3.8) is approachable
by player II; in particular he can get a payo® of at most minf¡x1;¡x2g when the
frequency of the actions of player I converges.











Now player II can determine (by choosing his actions appropriately) the fre-
quency of choice of action 1 by player I, but he has no way of determining the
relative frequency of action 2 compared to action 3. If we again consider the case
in which the frequency of the actions of player I converge to a limit (x1;x2;x3),
then:
i. if x1 ¸ 1=3, then player II gets a payo® of at most ¡1=3, by playing by
playing an appropriate strategy, with the frequency on his actions equal to 1
in the limit;
ii. otherwise, he can get a payo® of at most ¡1¡x1
2 , by playing an appropriate
strategy, with the frequency on his actions equal to (0;1=2;1=2) in the limit.
64 Preliminaries
The reduction of our basic problem to an approachability result derived for games
of incomplete information follows standard lines (as in Blackwell's proof [3] of
Hannan's theorem [8]). This proof is a classical result: a clear exposition may
be found in Luce and Rai®a, [11], pages 479-483). However, several important
modi¯cations will be necessary. In this section we review the basic concepts and
results needed in the sequel.
4.1 The full monitoring case
The idea of Blackwell's proof of Hannan's theorem is to de¯ne a game with vector
payo®s, (Gj)j2J, where J ´ f0;1;:::;Sg has cardinality S+1; (see [13] chapter II,
section 4, for details on games with vector payo®s: to understand what follows the
reader only needs to know that these are games where the payo® to each player is
a vector rather than a scalar.)
The payo® matrix for the ¯rst coordinate is the payo® matrix G0. The payo®
matrix for the coordinate j 2 f1;:::;Sg is the matrix Gj 2 RST, with Gj(s;t) = 1
if s = j, and Gj(s;t) = 0 otherwise. The role of this matrix Gj, for j 2 S, is simply
to count the number of times the action j has been chosen by the ¯rst player; the
average payo® in period n at the j 2 S coordinate is the frequency of action j in
the ¯rst n periods.
Blackwell then uses his approachability theorem. The average payo® of the









j(sn;tn); for j = 0;:::;S:
For any integer m and any vector y 2 Rm we de¯ne kyki´
Pm
k=1(jyk ji)1=i for
i = 1;2, where j yk j is the absolute value of yk. The distance between the two
vectors x and y is denoted by di(x;y) ´ kx ¡ yki. We are going to use the same
notations di independently of the dimension m; di(x;C) is the di-distance between
x 2 Rm and a set C. Recall that for an m-dimensional vector x
kxk2￿kxk1￿kxk2 (m)
1=2: (4.9)
As usual a set C is said to be approachable by player II if this player has a
strategy ¿ such that for all ² > 0 there is an integer N such that for all strategies
¾ of the opponent
P¾;¿(sup
n¸N
d2(gn;C) ￿ ²) ¸ 1 ¡ ²: (4.10)
Now de¯ne the set in R £ ¢(S):




7This set is convex, it is also easy to show directly that the Blackwell's condition
for this set to be approachable by player II is satis¯ed; which gives Hannan's result.
Since we do not use this condition directly, but rather a reformulation which we
are going to discuss immediately, we refer the reader to pages 479 to 483 of [11]
and continue.
4.2 Approachable sets
Here is the reformulation we mentioned. First de¯ne for every z 2 RS+1 a zero-sum







in which the second player is minimizing. Denote by v(z) its value. Then it follows
from Blackwell's theorem and the minimax theorem (for a proof see [13], Corollary
4.6, section 4, chapter II; but see also [11], page 480, for the main idea) that a
convex set C µ RS+1 is approachable by player II if and only if
sup
c2C
hc;zi ¸ v(z) for every z 2 R
S+1: (4.12)
where hc;zi denotes the inner product.
For the class of convex sets of the form (4.14) below, this condition has a simpler
form. Let w 2 RS+1 be such that:
hw;pi ¸ v(p); for all p 2 ¢(J): (4.13)




j; for all j 2 Jg = w ¡ R
S+1
+ (4.14)
is approachable by player II.
The proof of this result is in [13], (Proposition 2.13, section 2, chapter V) but
the idea of the proof is simple. For any integer m, the set Rm
+ is the set of elements
in Rm with non-negative components, and for any two subsets A and B of Rm,
A ¡ B ´ fa ¡ b : a 2 A;b 2 Bg: (4.15)
The set w ¡ RS+1
+ is convex, so by the characterization presented in (4.12), it is




hc;zi ¸ v(z) for every z 2 R
S+1: (4.16)
But for vectors z which are either zero, or have at least one component negative
the conclusion is trivial (in the second case because the supremum in (4.16) is +1);
for non-negative non-zero vectors the conclusion follows dividing the two sides of
8the inequality in (4.16) (which are linearly homogeneous) by k z k1, and using
(4.13).
The reformulation in (4.13) introduces a simpli¯cation, at some cost. The
simpli¯cation is that we can restrict attention to vectors in the simplex ¢(J)
rather than considering all the vectors z 2 RS+1, as in (4.12). The cost is that
we can prove approachability in this way only for convex sets C with the property
that C ¡ RS+1
+ µ C. We can however deal with the case of general convex sets
easily, by rewriting our convex set appropriately. In the proof of the main result
this is done in the paragraph following the equation (5.22).
4.3 Non-revealing strategies with partial monitoring
In this subsection we discuss the meaning of non-revealing strategies. No technical
result, or concept needed later will be presented. Rather, we try to provide an
intuitive reason for the de¯nition of non-revealing strategies given later in equation
(5.31). For details, see [13], chapter V, in particular page 229.
Consider ¯rst the case of games with full monitoring. The value of the game
with payo® matrix D(p) de¯ned in (4.11) is also the expected value of a game with
S + 1 states of nature, and where
i. player I is informed about the state, and might play a di®erent strategy xj
for every state, but
ii. he plays non-revealing strategies, so that the posterior p (of the second player)
does not change.
Formally, a non-revealing strategy at p is a vector of strategies (xj)j2J such
that xj = xj
0 for every j for which pj > 0 and pj
0 > 0.
In the case of games with partial monitoring, the concept of non-revealing has
to be modi¯ed: a non-revealing strategy of the informed player is not a strategy
which is constant across states, but a strategy which gives the same vector in ¢(B)
independently of the state.
Formally, a non-revealing strategy at p with signaling structure (B;Q) is a
vector of strategies (xj)j2J such that xjQ = xj
0Q for every j such that pj > 0 and
pj
0 > 0. The corresponding value vQ is now the value of the zero-sum game where
the informed player is playing non revealing strategies. The set c ¡ RS+1
+ is a set
of approachable vectors if:
fc 2 R
S+1 j hc;pi ¸ vQ(p); for all p 2 ¢(J):g (4.17)
4.4 Games with a continuum of types.
In the previous section we have introduced games with J states of nature, and
player I is informed about j. In this section we introduce an extension of this
9concept to games with a continuum of types, as presented in [13], (chapter V ,
section 3.h.)
We consider the following repeated game with incomplete information. K is a
¯nite set of states of nature (in the proof of the main result the cardinality of K
will be 2S +1); for each element k 2 K there is a payo® matrix Gk. Endow ¢(K)
with the Borel structure, consider the set of probabilities ¢(¢(K)) over it, and ¯x
an element ¹ in this set. This element is known to both players. Nature chooses
¯rst a probability p 2 ¢(K) according to ¹ and communicates it to player I; then
chooses the state k 2 K according to p, but does not reveal it to either player.
Then the two players play the in¯nitely repeated game, where actions, payo®s
and information are as described previously; its value is a function on ¢(¢(K))
denoted u. We do not make the dependence on (B;Q) explicit, since it will be
¯xed in the rest.
Now the informed player does not know the state, but simply the probability
distribution according to which the state was chosen. So the value of the game
is a function u de¯ned on ¢(¢(K)); a strategy of player I in the stage game
is a function from ¢(K) to ¢(S); a non-revealing strategy is a strategy which
does not provide information on the distribution q 2 ¢(K); and the inequality
hc;pi ¸ vQ(p) in (4.17) is replaced by
hh;¹i ¸ u(¹) for every ¹ 2 ¢(¢(K)) (4.18)
with the ¯nite dimensional inner product hc;pi replaced by the inner product hh;¹i
of a function h and a measure ¹. In particular the approachability result for this
setup that we are going to use is in the second part of proposition 3.47, section 3,
chapter V of [13]. This result is recalled in proposition 5.4 below for convenience.
5 Proof of the Main result
We have now all the elements to proceed with the proof of the main result. Here
is an outline of the main steps of the argument.
Outline of the proof
The three main steps in the proof are presnted in section 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 as follows:
i. in section 5.1 we de¯ne the set C ½ RS+1 we want to prove is approachable
by player II; C is de¯ned in equation (5.22). We prove that C is a convex
set; then we let K ´ f0;1;:::;2Sg, and transform C into a set ^ C ½ R2S+1
de¯ned in (5.24). This set is also convex, and invariant under translation by
the negative orthant (see equation (5.25) below). Lemma 5.1 proves that C
is approachable if and only if ^ C is approachable;
10ii. in section 5.2 we associate to the set ^ C a special function h, and after some
preliminary result we prove in corollary 5.3 the basic inequality
Z
¢(K)
h(q)¹(dq) ¸ u(¹); for every ¹ 2 ¢(¢(K)) (5.19)
which corresponds to the equation (4.13) for the set de¯ned in equation (4.14)
in the full monitoring case;
iii. in the ¯nal section 5.3 we use a result in the approachability theory for games
with a continuum of types reported as Proposition 5.4, which implies that ^ C
is approachable if the function h sati¯es (5.19); we then conclude by proving
that the set C is approachable.
We now present the three main steps in detail.
5.1 The set C





is concave because it is a minimum of linear functions; so (see the second part of
theorem 5.7 in Rockafellar [14]), the function
(Qf)(y) ´ maxff(x) : xQ = yg





(the ¯rst equality follows from the de¯nitions of ©Q and of f, the second from the
de¯nition of Qf), and (Qf)(¢Q) is a concave function by the ¯rst part of theorem
5.7 of Rockafellar [14].
The set which we claim is approachable by player II is C µ R £ ¢(S), the
hypograph of ©Q:
C ´ f(b;x) 2 R £ ¢(S) : b ￿ ©Q(x)g; (5.22)
C is a convex set because ©Q is concave. We now transform the set C into a more
convenient form: the purpose is to get a set that satis¯es the two properties (5.25)







®(C) ´ f®(b;x) : (b;x) 2 Cg:
Finally we let
^ C ´ ®(C) ¡ ff0g £ R
2S
+ g: (5.24)
Since C is convex and ® is linear, ®(C) is convex and so is ^ C. Also it is easy to
check that
^ C ¡ R
2S+1
+ = ^ C: (5.25)
We want to show that the distance between the average payo® in the vector
payo® game, which is a vector of the form (b;x) 2 R £ ¢(S), and the set C is
eventually small. But we ¯nd it convenient to show that the distance between
®(b;x) and the set ^ C is eventually small. These two statements turn out to be
equivalent in view of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1 For any (b;x) 2 R £ ¢(S)
d1(®(b;x); ^ C) = d1((b;x);C): (5.26)
Proof. An element of ^ C has the form (c0;:::;cs ¡ zs
1;¡cs ¡ zs
2;:::), with c ´




d1(®(b;x); ^ C) = min
c2C;z2R2S
+











































5.2 The functions h and u
Let K ´ f0;1;:::;2Sg. It will prove convenient to write an element q of the








so h is the support function of the set ®(C), restricted to ¢(K), hence a convex

















Now we de¯ne a game with a continuum of types (see section 4.4 for the de¯-
nition): the state space is K, and for every s 2 S, we de¯ne the payo® matrix
G
s(s
0;t) = 1 if s = s
0; and 0 otherwise;







For any ¹ 2 ¢(¢(K)), supp(¹) is the support of ¹. We also denote by X the
set of all functions from ¢(K) to ¢(S). The set of non-revealing strategies at ¹,
denoted NR(¹), is de¯ned to be the set:
f» 2 X : 9¯ 2 ¢(B)
T s. t. »(q)Q = ¯ for all q 2 supp(¹)g (5.31)
We denote by »(q)s the probability assigned to the action s by »(q). For every
¹ 2 ¢(¢(K)) consider the zero-sum game, with players I and II, choosing a
































well de¯ned by Sion's theorem [15], and is denoted by u(¹) (since the signaling
structure (B;Q) is ¯xed we do not make the dependence explicit in the notation).

























¯(¹); for every ¹: (5.34)
We now prove :


























































































































The ¯rst equality follows from (5.29) and the de¯nition (3.7) of the function ©Q,















































only depends on ¯ and not on x; the ¯rst inequality is clear (the ¯ is now chosen
independently of q); the fourth equality is simply the linearity of the integral.


























2)¹(dq); for every ¯ 2 ¢(B)
T: (5.36)
Next, we estimate the term u¯(¹), for an arbitrary ¯ 2 ¢(B)T:
u
¯(¹) = sup

































































































The ¯rst equality is the de¯nition of u¯; the second equality follows from the
de¯nition of support of a measure; the third equality by de¯nition of the function
F, the linearity of the integral, and the fact that the y variable does not appear
in the second integral; the ¯rst inequality follows from a basic property of the sup;
the fourth equality follows from Sion's theorem [15]; and the last equality follows
from the measurable selection theorem (see for instance [5], theorem 3.1.1, page
111).
We now combine the two inequalities in (5.36) and (5.37) to prove the claim in
the lemma; since the second term both sums is the same, we only need to prove



















Consider the zero-sum game with payo® matrix G0 where the player I, who maxi-
mizes, has to choose x such that xQ = ¯. Let ^ x and ^ y be equilibrium strategies in
this game, that is respectively maximin and minimax strategies, and v(G0;¯) be







^ x and ^ y are in fact, by de¯nition of equilibrium, also equilibrium strategies in the
game q0G0 for any non-negative q0. Hence the result.
Obviously:
Corollary 5.3 For h de¯ned as in (5.28) and every ¹ 2 ¢(¢(K)),
Z
¢(K)
h(q)¹(dq) ¸ u(¹): (5.39)
The equation (5.39) is the main conclusion of this section.
5.3 Final Step
We can now apply the second part of proposition 3.47, section 3, chapter V of
[13]. We reproduce here the statement of that proposition, adapted to our case,
for convenience of the reader. Let L ´ maxfmax(s;t)2S£T j G(s;t) j;1g. Recall
that the average payo® g0






Proposition 5.4 (Mertens-Sorin-Zamir) For every h that satis¯es (5.39), and
any sequence ²n converging to zero there is a sequence ±n with 2 ¸ ±n ¸ ±n+1
converging to zero and a strategy ¿h of player II such that for every n ¸ 0 and
every strategy ¾ of the player I,
P¾;¿h(N ¸ n) ￿ exp(¡n²n); (5.41)
where N ´ supfn j En > L±ng (with sup(;) = 0), where
En ´ max
q2¢(K)
[hgn;qi ¡ h(q)]: (5.42)
The function h as de¯ned in (5.28) is a function that satis¯es (5.39) thanks
to corollary (5.3). From this proposition and the preliminary results derived in
the previous sections we now derive our main result. First we de¯ne a set to be
approachable in the sense of (5.4):
De¯nition 5.5 The set C (de¯ned in (5.22)) is approachable if for every sequence
²n converging to zero there is a sequence ±n with 2 ¸ ±n ¸ ±n+1 converging to zero
16and a strategy ¿ of player II such that for every n ¸ 0 and every strategy ¾ of the
player I,
P¾;¿(N ¸ n) ￿ exp(¡n²n); (5.43)
where N ´ supfn j ^ En > L±ng (with sup(;) = 0), where
^ En ´ d2((g
0
n;fn);C): (5.44)
Finally we give the precise formulation of our main theorem (3.2):
Proposition 5.6 The set C is approachable by player II.
Proof. We have seen in section 5.2 that the function h de¯ned in (5.28) satis¯es
the basic property (5.39). So by the proposition 5.4 we conclude that there exists
a strategy ¿h such that holds for En, de¯ned in (5.42).
We now claim that
if En ￿ ² then ^ En ￿ ²(2S + 1): (5.45)
From this it follows that the basic estimate of the probability (5.43) given by
(5.41) in proposition (5.4) holds also for ^ En, de¯ned in (5.44). This will conclude
the proof of the lemma. So we can now turn to the proof of the claim (5.45).
For any y, denote by p ^ C(y) the projection of y on ^ C, that is the unique element
of ^ C at minimum d2-distance from y.
We prove two preliminary results, (5.46) and (5.49) below. First, we claim that
for any element y 2 R2S+1 n ^ C,
q
¤ ´
y ¡ p ^ C(y)
k y ¡p ^ C(y) k1
2 ¢(K): (5.46)
The only thing we have to prove is that y ¡ p ^ C(y) is a vector with non-negative
components. To see this, recall that the normal cone to a set A at a point x is:
NA(x) ´ fv : hx ¡ c;vi ¸ 0 for all c 2 Ag: (5.47)
First we have:
y ¡ p ^ C(y) 2 N ^ C(p ^ C(y)); (5.48)
(this is well known: the statement follows for instance from the two theorems 2.5.4,
page 66 and 2.4.2, page 51, of Clarke [5]; or from theorem 3.1.1 in chapter III of
Hiriart-Urruty and Lemarechal [9].) From the basic property (5.25) of the set ^ C
we have that p ^ C(y) ¡ R2S+1
+ ½ ^ C and therefore N ^ C(p ^ C(y)) ½ Np ^ C(y)¡R2S+1
+ (p ^ C(y));
but Np ^ C(y)¡R2S+1
+ (p ^ C(y)) = R2S+1
+ , hence the claim (5.46) is proved.
Second, the de¯nition of N ^ C(p ^ C(y)) implies that
hp ^ C(y) ¡ c;q
¤i ¸ 0
17for all c 2 ^ C, hence
h(q
¤) = hp ^ C(y);q
¤i: (5.49)




¤) ￿ ²: (5.50)
Using (5.49) one can compute:
hy;q
¤i ¡ h(q
¤) = hy ¡ p ^ C(y);
y ¡ p ^ C(y)
k y ¡ p ^ C(y) k1
i ￿ ²; (5.51)
and we conclude after an elementary rearrangement and using (4.9)
k y ¡ p ^ C(y) k
2
2 ￿ ² k y ¡ p ^ C(y) k1
￿ ² k y ¡ p ^ C(y) k2 (2S + 1)
1=2; (5.52)
hence:
k y ¡ p ^ C(y) k2￿ ²(2S + 1)
1=2 (5.53)
Now if En ￿ ² then the inequality (5.50) holds if we set y = gn; so if we set
y = gn also in (5.46) then (5.52) holds, and therefore kgn¡p ^ C(gn)k2￿ ²(2S+1)1=2;
we conclude d2(gn; ^ C) ￿ ²(2S + 1)1=2. But d1(gn; ^ C) = d1((g0
n;fn);C) by lemma
5.1 and (5.40). Therefore (recall (4.9)):
d2((g
0
n;fn);C) ￿ ²(2S + 1);
so our claim (5.45) is proved.
6 Conclusion
The main result of this paper has been a simple characterization of the minimum
regret in a game where the player has imperfect monitoring on the actions of the
opponent. The worst case payo® is fully described by the function ©Q.
This result suggests several possible measures of the value of information (that
is, of the value of di®erent signaling structures). For instance, one can introduce a
simple partial ordering on signaling structures, for a given payo® matrix G0, and
say that (B;Q) is better than (B
0;Q
0), for player II, given G0, if
©Q ￿ ©Q
0:
A partially open question is the issue of the speed of convergence. It is known
from an example due to Zamir (see [13], page 290) that the rate of convergence in
the general case is strictly worse than the rate O(n¡1=2) in the full monitoring case,
namely O(n¡1=3). See also on this Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and Schapire [1].
It remains to be seen if there are interesting connections between the two matrices
of payo® G0 and of signals Q and the speed of convergence.
Finally, a simpler proof, independent of the approachablity result proved in
[13] should be possible, perhaps along the lines of Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and
Schapire [1]. This is left to future research.
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